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Summary findings
Despite interesting work on infectious diseases by such  to many diseases for which interventions exhibit a
economists as Peter Francis, Michael Kremer, and Tomas  continuum of intensities subject to diminishing marginal
Philipson, the literature does not set out the general  returns.
structure of externalities involved in the prevention and  Infections and actions to prevent or cure them entail
cure of such diseases. Gersovitz and Hammer identify  costs. Individuals balance those parts of different costs that
two kinds of externality. First, infectious people can  they can actually control. In balancing  costs to society,
infect other people, who in turn can infect others, and so  government policy should take individual behavior into
on, in what the authors call the pure  infection  account. Doing so requires a strategy  combining preventive
externality.  In controlling their own infection, people do  and curative interventions to offset both the pure infection
not take into account the social consequence of their  externality and the pure infection externality. The relative
infection. Second, in the pure prevention  externality,  one  importance of the strategy's components depends on:
individual's preventive actions (such as killing  -The  biology of the disease-including  whether an
mosquitoes) may directly affect the probability of others  infection is transmitted from person to person or by
becoming infected, whether or not the preventive action  vectors.
succeeds for the individual undertaking it.  * The possible outcomes of infection: death, recovery
Gersovitz and Hammer provide a general framework  with susceptibility, or recovery with immunity.
for discussing these externalities and the role of  *  The relative costs of the interventions.
government interventions to offset them. They move the  * Whether  interventions are targeted at the population
discussion away from its focus on HIV (a fatal infection  as a whole, the uninfected, the infected, or contacts
for which there are few interventions) and on  between the uninfected and the infected.
vaccinations (which involve plausibly discrete decisions)  * The behavior of individuals that leads to the two
to more general ideas of prevention and cure applicable  types of externalities.
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The economic approach to infectious diseases is in its infancy, somewhat oddly because many
economists have long had the intuition that epidemics and infectious diseases are quintessential
manifestations of the principle of an externality, itself a central concept in economics (Brito et al.
1991). Furthermore, epidemiology provides ready-made dynamic models of disease transmission
and economics provides methods of dynamic optimization, and ones that provide guidelines for
policy.  Policy toward infections is of great importance. Yet only recently have economists begun
to look at these questions in a formal way.
This paper has two main goals. The overarching goal is to dissect the externalities
involved in infectious diseases when there are the options of both prevention and cures, so that
the relative phasing of these two types of interventions is important. Furthermore, we want to
see how externalities are manifested with regard to these two types of interventions. To achieve
this goal, we need to state the social planner's or first-best problem and to compare it to a
representative agent's problem.  To avoid compounding the identification of any externalities
with problems of myopia, imperfect ability to insure health outcomes, or a disregard for the
welfare of future generations, we choose a formulation of the representative agent in which these
problems do not arise,,  allowing us to focus exclusively on the externalities that we identify.
The economic literature on infectious diseases has taken as its starting point some special
although important concerns. This starting point has influenced modeling strategies in ways that
we believe obscures the general structure of private choice and consequent externalities in the
process of disease transmission. One focus of the previous literature has been on vaccinations
(Brito et al. 1991, Francis 1997, Geoffard and Philipson 1997 and Kremer 1996). It is certainly
an important intervention but one that is only possible for a limited number of diseases.
1Importantly from a modeling strategy, however, vaccination is plausibly a discrete decision, to
vaccinate or not, and whether it is or not, that is how it has been modeled.  Indeed, Francis
models vaccination as a discrete choice by identical individuals.  With neither an intensive
margin (choice of intensity of vaccination) nor an extensive margin (heterogenous individuals),
he concludes that vaccination does not exhibit externalities. Philipson  (2000 and cited
references) and associates and Kremer (1996) have focused on  HIV/AIDS. For this disease
prevention is naturally the almost exclusive focus, none of this work analyzes curative or
palliative behavior, and the transition from infection is to death, rather than to recovered and
susceptible or immune.  As we will show, the state that follows infection is important for the
analytical tractability of the model, and a fatal disease is not the easiest to analyze. In fact,
Geoffard and Philipson (1996) analyze HIV under the assumption that infection raises an
individual's discount rate but does not lead to a diminution in the population; while tractable,
such a formulation hardly incorporates the salient feature of this fatal infection. Furthermore, the
work of Philipson and his associates formulates prevention as an entirely discrete choice (safe or
risky sex). Whether this formulation is realistic for HIV is open to question; regardless, it is clear
to us that it ignores the important scope for varying preventive effort that arises for many other
diseases which present a virtual continuum of degrees of prevention.  Oral-fecal diseases provide
good examples of such a continuum: boil water progressively longer, wash hands on more and
more occasions. Kremer (1996) stresses heterogeneous behavior in the population which leads
him to a wide range of interesting conclusions about HIV.  For our purposes, however, his
assumption that people are not future-oriented in their risk-taking behavior limits the
applicability of his model to our question because it confounds myopia with externalities.
In the economics literature on infections, Wiemer(1987) is an  exception to the study of
2one type of intervention in isolation. He models the use of two interventions in the case of
bilharzia, but under assumptions about costs and benefits that imply that one of the two
interventions is used maximally or not at all. Furthermnore,  he does not model decisions by
individuals and the associated externalities of this type of vector-spread disease. Epidemiologists
have also analyzed the problem of optimal interventions to control infections, but have not
surprisingly ignored many of the issues we investigate.  I
Once we have adopted a framework that can achieve our first goal, our second goal is to
examine a typology  of infectious diseases. This typology allows for people to progress from
being susceptible to infected (and infectious) to: (1) recovered but again susceptible, or (2)
immune, or (3) dead. Furthermore, the typology includes diseases that spread from person to
person and those that are spread by intermediate vectors, such as mosquitos. Finally, the typology
allows for the targeting of different interventions at different groups. We show how these
different characteristics of the epidemic affect conclusions about how to offset extemalites and
how the preventive and curative interventions are phased relative to each other.
In fact, we identify two types of externalities: First, infectious people can infect other
people who in turn infect others and so on, the source of what we call the pure infection
externality. This externality arises if, in choosing their own levels of preventive and curative
effort, people do not fully take into account the costs to others who will become infected as a
I  Wickwire (1977) surveys earlywork and Sethi and Staats (1978), Greenhalgh (1988) and
Hocking (1991) are more recent. This literature, however, has several shortcomings. First, the
objective function is often poorly specified, with no discounting and a finite horizon. More
importantly, marginal costs and benefits are typically assumed constant leading to unrealistic
bang-bang solutions. Usually, there is no discussion of the co-ordination of multiple
interventions. Finally, these models do not incorporate health choices by individuals, and
therefore do not discuss externalities and the decentralization of the optimal policies, a topic we
stress.
3consequence of their being infectious. Second, there is a pure prevention externality that arises
because the preventive actions of one individual may directly affect the probability that other
people become infected, whether or not the preventive action prevents infection of the individual
undertaking it. Typically, the pure prevention externality arises only for diseases that involve a
vector and therefore appears only in the last model of the paper. An example is the use of
insecticides to kill mosquitos that carry disease. The person using the insecticide may or may not
be bitten and infected but the killing of mosquitos lessens the probability that others will be
bitten and infected, something that the user of the insecticide may disregard.
As is conventional in modeling externalities, the paper begins with the problem of a
hypothetical social planner who can directly control all preventive and curative actions, initially
in a model of infection from person to person. First, we lay out the accounting for the people who
are in different disease statuses and the dynamics that move people from one status to another,
the constraints on the optimization problem. Next, we introduce the objective of decision takers:
the maximization of utility net of the costs of the disease in terms of discomfort, fear and
economic loss and net of the costs of preventive and curative measures. We then maximize the
objective function subject to the constraints, and look at the optimal solution to the social
planner's problem and how it depends on what happens to people who are infected. The next
section looks at the decentralized decisions, their deviation from the social planner's choices, and
hence the existence of externalities and the role for public interventions. A penultimate section
looks at some of these issues when vectors transmit disease. The paper ends with some
concluding remarks.
42. The Social Planner's Problem
A. The Dynamic Constraints
The starting point for the study of optimal policy toward infectious diseases is the classic
literature on mathematical epidemiology. It provides the dynamic constraints that condition
decisions about infectious diseases.  This literature models many diseases, ones transmitted
directly from person to person and ones transmitted by vectors (Anderson and May, 1991).
In the most general model of diseases transmitted from person to person that we consider,
the total number of people (N) is the sum of the number who are: (1) susceptible (S); (2) infected
and infectious (I); and (3) recovered and immune, i.e. uninfectible (U):
(1)  N  = S+I+U
The proportions of these groups in the population are denoted by s, i, and u, with s + i + u = 1 .
The birth rate of the population is e  while deaths only occur as a proportion, 5, of the infections
at any time, so that the net change in the population is:
(2)  N=eN  -6I
The number of susceptibles changes according to:
(3)  S  = eN  -aSi  +PI  .
The first part of the right-hand side embodies the assumption that all newborns are susceptible.
The second part reduces the number of susceptibles by those people who become infected.
Under the assumption of random contacts, the probability per contact of a susceptible person's
meeting an infected (and infectious) person is the proportion of infected people in the population,
i=I1N. 2 The  product,  Si, is the number of susceptibles who do so.  The factor a is an adjustment
2 We assume that each  person has the same  rate of contacts. Kremer (1996) examines some
behavioral aspects of models in which different people have different rates of contact.
5incorporating both the rate of contact and the inherent infectiousness of an infected (or
susceptibility of a susceptible). The third part is the addition to the susceptible pool resulting
from the recovery of a fraction, ,B,  of the infecteds.
The number of infecteds evolves according to:
(4)  I  = aSi  - PI - oI  -y  yI
The first three terms on the right-hand side have been discussed in connection with equations (2)
and (3).  The last term accounts for the transition of the fraction y of the infecteds to the status of
immunes. Correspondingly, the number of immunes evolves according to:
(5)  U=  yI  .
These equations can be solved for the change in the three proportions:
(6)  s  =  (1-s)E  +(8  -a)si  +pi
(7)  i  =  asi  +6i2 -(E  +6  +P +Y)i
and
(8)  u=  6iu +yi  -Eu
In the subsequent discussion, we will consider how preventive and curative actions by
governments and individuals affect the parameters of the model: a, [, 6, and y.  Without any
such interventions, however, these parameters are fixed, and the model of equations (5)-(8)
evolves to a steady state. In particular, the steady state may be one in which s = 1 and i=u=O  and
the disease disappears, rather than one in which s, i and u lie strictly between 0 and 1. In the
former case, optimal policy would be to approach optimally the steady state in which the disease
disappears. In other cases, it may be desirable to adopt policies that eradicate the disease even
though in the absence of interventions the steady-state  proportion of infecteds would be positive.
With few exceptions, however, we do not believe that eradication, optimal or otherwise, is
6feasible, and we will be studying situations in which optimal policy involves optimally moving to
and sustaining a steady state with a positive level of infection.
B. The Objectives and the Optimization
We are now ready to specify the social planner's objective function and then to provide
necessary conditions for a maximization of this objective function with respect to expenditures
on preventive and curative actions. The government controls two policy variables, preventive
effort of a > 0 units and curative effort of b 2 0 units.  These health inputs affect the parameters
of the model, a(a) and 13(b),  y(b) and  6(b) and thereby determine respectively the rate of
infection and the rates of transition to recovered-but-susceptible, immune, and dead. The
controls exhibit diminishing marginal products so that: cc'<,  oa">O,  P'>o,  P"<o,  y'>O,  y"<0, and
Sko,  8">0.  This property of our formulation distinguishes it from all the preceding work that we
know, and it opens the scope for internal solutions to the optimal policy problem and for the
analysis of the co-ordination of multiple interventions phased in a smooth way over the course of
an epidemic. We believe that for many if not all diseases there is scope for undertaking
additional preventive and curative interventions that are marginally less and less productive.
Interventions are costly; preventive effort costs Pa  per unit and curative effort costs  Pb  per unit.
The objective of government policy is to maximize the present discounted value of social
welfare:
(9)  W =  fN  I  Jo-Jpi  +pa,aOa+Pbb6b  }e-r
0
in which r is the discount rate, V. is the money value of utility in the absence of the disease, p, is
7the current money cost of being infected (and sick) such as foregone wages while ill and
including the monetary equivalent of pain and suffering, Pa is the cost per unit of the preventive
intervention of amount a, and Pb is the cost per unit of the curative intervention of amount b. The
integrand of  equation (9) is the weighted average of the current incomes of the infected (net of
the current cost of infection), the uninfected, and the uninfectible, less the total costs of health
interventions. Future costs of a current illness arising from the failure to be cured instantly or the
subsequent infection of others are accounted for when they happen, either by the continuation of
the infected status in future periods (again the value being Pl) or the accretion of new infections
as they occur; these future costs are not included in the current cost of being infected. The
objective function embodies an assumption of linearity in the value of income net of the costs of
infection and expenditures on health interventions. This assumption simplifies many aspects of
the subsequent calculations; we introduce concavity into the model via the diminishing returns of
health expenditures on the parameters of the dynamics of epidemic rather than through
diminishing marginal utility of net income. Among other simplifications, linearity of the
objective function allows us to sidestep the question of the interaction between the epidemic and
the health insurance regime, the latter itself a complex topic for analysis.
The 0', j = a, b in equation (2) specify the proportions of the population that generate
costs associated with an infectious disease. We refer to the & as targeting functions; in general,
they depend on s and i.  The most natural formulation would be for prevention to be targeted at
the susceptible (a  = s) and for cures to be targeted at the infected (Ob  =  i).  Other formulations
may, however, be plausible depending on the ability to identify and reach different groups and
what makes sense in terms of the disease and the balance of costs and benefits, something
considered in more detail in the following sections that deal with special cases. The type of
8targeting may be a choice variable, but in this paper we will assume that it is a technical given
and compare the behavior of the model under different targeting assumptions.
Equation (9) therefore provides the objective function while equations (2) and (6)-(8)
provide the dynamic equations that constrain the optimization problem.  The current-value
Hamiltonian, H, is:
(10)  H  = N { Vo- [pji+paa0Ia+pbbOb]  }
+  As N[(1  -s)E  +(8  -a)si+  pi]
+  I N N[e  -8 i]
+  1,  N[asi+  6i 2 -(y+8+p+e)i]
in which (X5 ,N), XN and (XiN)  are the current value multipliers.
The first derivatives of H with respect to the controls, a and b, set equal to zero imply:
(1la)  PaO0 = (,X1-AX.)a'si
and
(llb)  Pbb  =  1,(8  s+p)i_ANb  i+A[6Zi2-(o/+p/+y)i]
Under  the assumptions  on the 0'  and on a' and P', the difference  between  As  and R.X  must  be
positive if the first-order conditions are to hold.  hi addition, the dynamic equations for the
multipliers imply:
(1lc)  s  =  rxs+paa0'+pbbE)b  +(S-XI)ai
(lId)  'N  =  XN(r+bi-E)  -[VO-(pVi+pa0ao+PbbOb)]
and
9(lle)  1i  = [r+y +8(1-i)+P-as]X+pI+paa  bIb+pbb  -_%[( -a)s+P]  +XN6
Inspection of equations (6), (7) and ( lIa-e) shows that the dynamic equations for s, i, and the  Lj) j
=  s,i, N do not involve N so that the dynamic system is independent of N although not of E or iN.
To develop the analysis further we turn to some special cases.
C. The Special Case of Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible  (SIS)
The model of a disease in which people recover only to become susceptible rather than
immune or die is the simplest case of the preceding model of any relevance. Many of the classic
sexually transmitted diseases fall in this category. In this case, y  =  U=u = 0; the controls
remain the variables a and b while the states are s and i. With the substitution of  i = (I-s) in the
current-value Hamiltonian, equation (10), Aj can be dropped as can be AN  because the model is
expressible without reference to the total size of the population, N, once no one dies.  The growth
rate of population is still a parameter because it determines part of the growth of the susceptibles.
The model therefore only has one state variable, s, with dynamic equation:
(12)  s  =  -as(1l-S)+(P+E)(1-S)
Equations (1 la-b) simplify in this case to:
(13a)  paOa  -X5a's(l-s)
and
(13b)  Pb, 0 =  ;LP(l-s).
Equation (1  3a) equates the marginal cost of an increase in the preventive intervention as
determined by the product of its price and targeting function to the marginal benefit of the
10increase in the proportion of the population that is uninfected achieved by the increase in
prevention.  Equation (13b) similarly equates the marginal cost of an increase in curative
intervention as determined by the product of its price and targeting function to the marginal
benefit of the increase in the proportion of the population that is uninfected achieved by the
increase in curative effort. All marginal costs and benefits are expressed in terms of the welfare
of the average member of the economy measured in dollars.
The variable X.  equals the shadow benefit in dollars to the average member of the
economy of an increase in the proportion of the population that is uninfected. Under the
assumptions on the 0'  and on a'  and ,B',  the X, must be positive if the first-order conditions are to
hold.  In addition, the dynamic equation for the multiplier implies:
(1  3c)  is  rX-  [Pr_PaaO  apbbO]  + [(1  -2s)+  e  -,E]A.
As before, the 0',  j = a, b in equation (12)-(13c) are targeting functions that specify the
proportion of the population affected by an intervention, and depend only on s because u = 0 and
therefore i = (1-s). For example, if the disease is sexually transmitted and the preventive policy
is condom distribution, then Oa  could plausibly take values of 1, s, 1-s, and s(1  -s). In the first
case, condoms are made available to everyone, in the second only to the uninfected, in the third
only to the infected and in the fourth only to matchings involving an uninfected and an infected
person. For curative interventions, the simplest case is targeting exclusively at the sick so that (b
= (1  -s), but other situations are possible. For instance, without any ability to diagnose the
disease, it may be that Ob = 1, while if it is difficult to distinguish the disease under
consideration from another, a value of 0 b  between 1-s and 1 is possible as determined by the
prevalence of the other disease.
11Equations (1  3a) and (1  3b) in combination imply that:
(14)  =-  PPb  bs
Equation (14), in turn, reveals a very rich set of possibilities for the pattern of relative
dependence on preventive and curative interventions over the course of an epidemic. The left-
hand side of this equation gives the absolute value of the ratio of the marginal products of the
two interventions relative to their prices (which are fixed exogenously), a measure of the relative
dependence of the policy package on prevention, a, relative to cure, b.  The right-hand side
depends only on s, the state of the epidemic; in an SIS disease there is an explicit solution for the
dependence of lb on s. While the relative emphasis on the two types of policies in terms of their
marginal products depends only on the state of the epidemic, it is extremely sensitive to the form
of the targeting functions. Table 1 records the eight possible relationships between (D  and s for
the combinations of the four formulations of the targeting function for a and the two for ,B. In
case IIA, (D  is relatively high when susceptibles and infecteds are nearly equal and is low for s
near either of its extremes, 0 or 1. Prevention efforts are most important when transmission rates
are at their maximum because the costs of prevention do not rise with the level of susceptibles,
but the marginal effect of prevention is highest when transmission is fastest. In case IIB, (D  falls
monotonically as s rises because costs of prevention rise and those of cure fall with an  increase
in susceptibles. In case HC, (D  rises monotonically as s rises and in case EID,  () is constant
regardless of the value of s, two cases that are less easy to interpret intuitively.  The ratios of the
marginal products do not translate directly into the ratios of the inputs themselves, perhaps the
most direct measure of the relative size of the two efforts.  But, there are special cases when the
12two ratios do move together  (see Appendix A for an example) and so (D  helps to understand the
possibilities for the co-movements of the physical inputs during the evolution of an epidemic.
To simplify what follows, we assume that Ob =  1-s,  so that targeting of curative
interventions is restricted to the infected and therefore 0 bs  =  -1 (cases IIA-D of Table 1). Total
differentiation of equations (13a) and (1  3b), the first-order conditions, implies:
(15a)  a  a  >  ,
(15b)  aj  - 43aa  a  aS(ls)-Oa(12s)1  <
s15bs  c"s(1-s)  J >
apa  X3 '(-ea (I 5c)  a  <  3a  =  __<
p  aPa  AX,a  /s(l -s)
(15a)  b  a  3b  =  >  ,
ab 3
(15e)  b5-  ab= O
as
and
(15])  bp  a b  1  <  .
These  expressions  simplify  the following  discussion.  They  all have straightforward
interpretations,  except  perhaps  the indeterminate  sign of the expression  in (1  5b) for the partial
13effect of s on a.  This ambiguity arises because s influences both the marginal cost of an increase
in a, via its role in the targeting function, and the marginal benefit of an increase in a, via the
effect of s on the dynamics of the epidemic. The variable a8: (1) has the same sign as (l-2s) if 0a
=  1; (2) is negative if Oa  = s; (3) is positive if 03 = (l-s); and (4) is zero if Oa  = s(l-s).
So far we have proceeded on the presumption that the first-order conditions determine a
maximum. In fact, the most generally-used sufficiency conditions for a maximum do not obtain
in this model, but we believe that the way we have characterized the maximization is, in fact,
correct for a very large class of these models . While the problem is concave in the controls
because they are subject to diminishing marginal returns, it is not concave in the state because the
dynamic equation exhibits increasing marginal returns in the state, a fundamental property of
contagion as posited by epidemiologists. Correspondingly, the failure of the sufficiency
conditions is not a reflection of the linearity of the instantaneous utility function [the integrand of
equation (9)]. Appendix A discusses these issues in detail.
Setting equations (12) and (13c) to zero produces the phase diagram in s-Xs  space. The
slope of the locus from setting equation (12) to zero is:
ax  ~a+alsa, 
(16a)  |  'sb=  a'saS  9 La  s=  pXbx  -a  Isa,  +
and the slope of the locus from setting equation (13c) to zero is:
(16b)  palsl  =  P-  [paa 30+pa6  -2a0  c+(1  -2s)a'la 3X3]  +
L  as Jl5=o  [r-as+P+(1-s)(a  +a'sa)]  ?
The signs of both slopes are ambiguous,  partially for the same reason that the sign of a, is
14ambiguous. Further progress requires the separate consideration of Cases IIA-D.
In two cases, IIB with (a  =  s and HID  with Oa =  s(l-s),  both slopes are positive when the
equations of motion are linearized about the steady-state so long as a variant of the conventional
condition that the interest rate at least equals the population growth rate (in the absence of
disease) holds, that is r>  E. 3 If the slope of the X  5  = 0 locus is flatter than that of the  s = 0
locus in s-4s space, there is a unique stable path to the steady state (Figure 1  a) because the
characteristic equation of the linearized dynamic system has one positive and one negative real
root.  The variables s and X 8move together toward the steady state, and b and P move with them
so that curative effort increases with more susceptibles. Preventive effort, a, and ac  move as
determined by the relation between a and b as given by 0,  decreasing with the number of
susceptibles in UB and varying with it in HID.  If the slope of the i  X = 0 locus is steeper than that
of the s = 0 locus in s-X, space, however, there is no stable path to the steady state (Figure lb). In
these cases, the model evolves either to the eradication of the disease, with s = 1, or to the
equilibrium without intervention, a = b = 0, but the optimal path has to be recalculated taking
explicit account of these state and control constraints. That such cases exist is consistent with the
structure of the model, which should allow the possibility of optimally eradicating the disease or
optimally doing nothing in the steady state for some configurations of the phase diagram. We do
not pursue these divergent cases here; instead, we restrict the discussion to diseases that are
(optimally) neither eradicated nor ignored.
The two remaining cases, IIA with (a  =  1 and IIC with (a  =  1-s, are more complex and
' Note that in cases IIB  and D the term (a+a'saj) is always positive.
15there are several sub-cases. 4 When the model is linearized about the steady state both slopes may
be positive, as in cases IIB and D, and the foregoing analysis obtains. The slope of the i X = O
locus may be positive while that of the s = 0 locus is negative; this case is unstable and we do
not discuss it further. Both slopes may be negative; if the A s = 0 locus is less negatively sloped
there is a stable saddlepoint (Figure Ic) while the reverse situation is unstable. 5
The parameters of the model are the four prices: PI,  Pa,  Pb and r.  The parameters p 1 and r
enter equation (1  3c) for i ,  but not equation (12) for s, nor do they enter the first-order conditions
for a and b.  They therefore shift the i X = 0 locus but not the s  = 0 locus.  Consider the effect of
an increase in P, on s', the steady-state  number of susceptibles in the two saddlepoint cases.  In
Figure la the A  . locus shifts up (from A  to X5'X5')  and s*  rises; in Figure lc the A  X  locus shifts
down and s*  also rises.  Thus in all cases an increase in the direct cost of being infected in terms
of pain and suffering increases the steady-state proportion of the population that is uninfected.
The effect on s*  of an increase in r is opposite to that of p,. The costs of preventing or curing an
infection are borne immediately while their benefits are received over time.  Because an increase
in r leads to a diminished weight of the future in decisions, an increase in r leads to an increase in
the optimal steady-state proportion of the population that is infected.
The effects of the other two parameters are more complicated, however, because both loci
shift. The impact effect (s and Xs  fixed) of an increase in the price of either preventive or curative
interventions is to decrease the amount used via equations (15c) and (15f) and therefore either a
4 In these cases the term (a+a'sa,)  may be positive or negative and therefore the numerator of
equation (1  6a) and the denominator of equation (1  6b) may be positive or negative. Note, however,
that if the denominator of (1  6b) is negative, so must be the numerator of equation (1  6a); it is not
possible to have a positively sloped s =0 locus and a negatively sloped A 5=O  locus.
5The  results in this sentence follow from the application of such standard references as Kamien
and Schwartz (1981, Appendix B). The saddlepoint case is their Case IC.
16and oc  or b and j3  are affected in both equations.
In the case of an increase in Pb, the s = 0 locus always shifts up regardless of the sign of
its slope.  The X 5=0  locus shifts up if its slope is positive and down if its slope is negative. In the
case of an equilibrium of the type illustrated in Figure 1  a, therefore, the shift in the s =0 locus
tends to lower s*  while the shift in the X  5=o  locus tends to raise s*  and the net outcome is
ambiguous even when the algebraic magnitudes of these shifts are taken into account. The
rationale for this ambiguity is as follows: The price of a curative intervention, Pb,  enters the
dynamic equation for the co-state variable in the same way as the cost of being infected, p,.  One
of the effects of an increase in Pb  is therefore to raise s, just as an increase in p, does; in effect an
increase in the cost of being cured is like an increase in the cost of being infected because every
infection induces expenditures on curative inputs. But there is also the fact that it is more
expensive to be cured so that it may be desirable to spend less on b and be cured less quickly.
That the first effect can dominate is easily seen from the special case when b is fixed at some
positive value (perhaps for technological reasons) so that the curative effort is not adjusted in
response to its price increase. The preventive intervention can still respond, however, as it would
to a change in P, and the steady state proportion of the uninfected, s*, is thereby increased. Recall
that cases IIB and D of Table I must conform to this latter pattern of an ambiguous impact of Pb.
In contrast, starting from an equilibrium of the type illustrated in Figure 1  c, the upward shift of
the s =0 locus and the downward shift of the  s  =0 locus work to raise s*.
In the case of an increase in Pa,  the s =0 locus also always shifts up regardless of the sign
of its slope.  When the system is linearized about the steady state, the A  =0 locus shifts
according to the sign of
17-ae  a  _eaa
r-e  +(1  -s)(a  +c&'sa)
rising with an increase in Pa  if this expression is positive and falling if it is negative.  The
denominator is unambiguously positive in cases I1B  and D and ambiguous in the other two cases
of Table 1. The numerator is of ambiguous sign in all four cases; in cases II A and D, this
numerator has the sign of (2s-1). Once again, these ambiguities stem from the role of s in
affecting both the costs and benefits of an increase in a (see the discussion of a,). Consequently,
little can be said about the effect of Pa  on s*.
D. The Special Case of Susceptible-Infected-Dead (SID)
If all people who become infected die, the general model of equation (10) can be
specialized to: U = 0, p = y = 0, Xi = 0.  The states are s and i = (l-s) and the controls are a and
b.  On the further assumption that being sick is not per se costly, P, = 0.  The value of curative
measures is to reduce the death rate and thereby gain utility from prolonging a life; formally, the
negative valuation of death is embodied in the fact that the dead are not part of N and do not get
the utility associated with being alive, V0, net of the expenditures on a and b.  To save space, we
do not repeat the versions of equations (II a-d) specialized for this case, but merely comment on
the properties of this case that follow from these equations. Furthernore, we only discuss the
results for the case in which (b  =  (1-S).
The specialized versions of equations (6) and (1 la-d) are independent of N but not of XN
and therefore so are the solutions for the optimal interventions, a and b, and for the state of the
epidemic, s. The first result implies that the interventions are independent of the scale of the
18economy. The second result implies that the dimension of the system is three (s, X5  and ;N)  rather
than the two of the SIS model.  This important difference between the two models arises because
the infected die in the SID model which is valued by AN,  rather than returning to the susceptible
state which is valued at k,  as in the SIS model. Consequently, the SID model is significantly less
tractable than the SIS model. The solutions for the SID case are not independent of e  which
appears in the specialized versions of equations (6) and (I lc and d).  The multipliers, X, and XN,
must be positive under the assumptions about Oa, at and 6'.
The SID first-order conditions imply that:
'I/Pb  (1 -S)pb+  1,N]
acIPa  PbO
In contrast to the SIS model, there is therefore no closed-form solution corresponding to the
relationship between s and (D  in the SIS case, so there is the potential for very much more
complicated relationships than those reported in Table 1.
E. The Special Case of Susceptible-Infected-Uninfectible  (SIU)
This case corresponds to f3  = 6 = 0; individuals who are susceptible become infected and
then immune.  The states are s, i and u=(l -s-i) and the contols are a and b. The only substantive
simplification of the social planner's problem that we have been able to identify in this case is
that the five-dimensional system of section lB can be reduced to four because AN  does not appear
in the dynamic equations for the other variables because people do not die of the disease. We
therefore do not present any results for this case except in section 2D on decentralization.
193. Decentralization
A. The General Problem ofDecentralization
To this point we have discussed the problem of the social planner who directly controls
the values of a and b in a model without people who make decisions that affect their own health.
The next step is to consider private decisions and their implications for government policy. If
people do not take into account the effect on the infection of the general population caused by
their ability to infect others if they become infected, they generate a pure infection externality. In
our formulation of diseases in which one person directly infects another, the preventive activity
of one individual does not, however, affect the probability that other people become infected
independently of whether the first person becomes infected, so there is no preventive externality.
Once we identify the externality, we examine how government interventions with subsidies or
taxes can decentralize the social planner's first-best solution.
In our abstract formulation, governments can subsidize preventive and curative activities,
the privately chosen values of a and b.  In reality, for some diseases, there will be some inputs
that are marketed and some inputs that involve individuals' non-marketed and unobservable
actions such as avoiding crowded places to varying degrees in the case of tuberculosis prevention
or adhering meticulously to drug regimens. When a and b involve such non-marketed and
unobservable actions the subsidy/tax interventions we propose may be infeasible or may have to
be targeted only on the marketed components of preventive and curative activities with second-
best implications.
The simplest way to illustrate the pure infection externality and its implications for policy
is to assume that private decisions are made by a group of people that we call a family, a
construct that we use as the representative decision-making agent. This construct provides a
20logically consistent and analytically tractable model to contrast with the model of the social
planner: First, the family's objective function is fully congruent with the social planner's.
Furthermore, the family understands and anticipates how the epidemic will evolve and is fully
forward-looking with regard to their possible future statuses as well as their present situation.
Unlike Kremer's (1996) modeling of individuals' behavior which is only oriented to the
conditions in the current period, our family takes account in its current decisions of the evolution
of the epidemic, its implications for the future risk of infection, and its implications for all the
famnily's  descendants. For instance, if the future probability of infection is high it affects the
current incentive of the family to make curative expenditures. It is therefore the case that our
rationale for government interventions do not depend either on myopia or on a discrepancy
between the social planner's and the representative agents' valuation of outcomes over the path
of the epidemic.
As is conventional in the public-economics treatment of externalities, the only distinction
between the social planner and the representative agent is that the family is assumed to be small
relative to the population as a whole, in this case so that the proportion of the family in any
disease status does not affect the proportion of the population as a whole that is in that status.  In
particular, this family takes as given the proportion of the population that is infected, which
equals the probability, T, that any random contact is with an infected person.  Second, the family
is assumed to be sufficiently large that it can fulfill the role of a representative agent and
therefore that the proportion of the family in each disease status is identical to the population
proportions. Finally, it is this family that takes decisions about the interventions, a and b.
Because the instantaneous utility function is linear, there is no sense in which the family is
performing any implicit insurance function for its members. A perhaps  more realistic but only
21perhaps (because people do indeed live in families) and less tractable approach would build the
private economy up from representative individuals each of whom is in one or another diseases
statuses at any one time and taking decisions about either prevention or cure (or neither if already
immune), with regard to their possible future statuses as well as their present situation.  For
diseases in which people transit from susceptible to infected to dead, the individual's problem
seems tractable, because death is obviously an absorbing state. But for individuals who cycle
between susceptible and infected, we have not been able to manage a formulation and we leave
this task for the future, but see no reason why such a formulation should fundamentally alter the
nature of the externalities that we identify.
The dynamic equations of this version of the model are the same as in section 1A, except
that in equations (3) and (4) the term oaSi  is replaced by aSic to denote the exogeneity from the
family's viewpoint of the proportion, n, of the population (in contrast to the proportion, i, of the
family) that is infected. There is a consequent change in equations (6) and (7).
A further change has to be made to the objective function to reflect the possibility of
government interventions. If there is an externality, the government may find it optimal to
subsidize or tax preventive and/or curative inputs.  To allow for these possibilities, we assume
that the representative family faces prices of qj= (1+t)pj, j = a, b.  As is standard in public
economics, so that any interventions are revenue neutral in a way that does not have any
incentive effects beyond the tj, we assume that the family receives a lump sum payment (possibly
negative) of T that it takes as exogenous to its own actions but that in fact equals tap,af + tbpbbf ; a
superscript "f'  indicates that the variables are evaluated at the family's values rather than the
social planner's. If this lump sum offset were not part of the package, the family's welfare would
be affected by its experiencing a net loss or gain of income as the governrment  intervenes with
22taxes or subsidies to offset the externality. The decentralization results that follow would not
obtain as can be seen by following the steps of the proofs without the assumption of revenue
neutrality.
With these modifications, the family's current-value Hamiltonian is:
(17)  Hf  = Nf  { Vf-  [p if+qqa  fO  a+qbb  fOb] +  T }
+  ;f_ Nf[(l-sf)E+8sfif-asf1t+Pi]
+  X{NNf[E-6i f]
+  X{Nf[asfir+8if2_(y+6+p+E)if]
All functions of variables (0, a,  , 8 and y) are evaluated at the family values of their arguments
while e  is a constant common to both the social planner's and the family's models. We now
proceed to the special cases.
B. Decentralization in the SIS Model
The family uses the version of equation (17) specialized to this case. We also assume
that only the infected are targeted by cures, so that 0 b =  (1 _St. The first-order conditions imply:
(18a)  qQ(a  = -X5a'sf(l-s)
and
(18b)  qb  = xf/'
and the co-state equation is:
(18c)  AS  = rXf-[p  -q8aas +qbbI+Af[a(1-s)+P]
23Because the group is representative of society, s must equal sf. Once this substitution is
made, the only differences between equations (12) and (13a-c), the planner's problem, and
equations (17) and (1  8a-c), the private problem, are the qj and the (1  -s) terrm  at the end of
equation (18c) rather than the (1-2s) tern  at the end of equation (13c).  This latter difference
reflects precisely the fact that the family takes the general rate of infection as exogenous in
making its decisions and it deternines whether the government's optimal intervention is a tax or
a subsidy as is shown below.
The government can induce private decision makers to take decisions that coincide with
the planner's problem by instituting equiproportionate changes in Pa  and Pb; comparison of the
two sets of first-order conditions for a and b shows that ta =  tb = t.  In other words, the
government compensates for any differences between X,  and  AS, in equations (13a-b) and (18a-
b). It does so with a lump-sum offset, T, so that any revenues or expenditures from the price
interventions also appear in the family's budget. Because the intervention is only to 5f  and
because of the way Xi, enters equations (1  8a-b), a and b activities are affected to the same degree
and (D  is unaffected. At the steady state, the intervention is a subsidy at rate t':
I&  *as  *
(19)  t*  s  >  0
p+4 5as  *
in which Xs*  and s  are the values from the planner's steady state. 6 Furthermore,  for any non-steady-
state  s, the government  must intervene  with a subsidy. 7 This finding  that the intervention  is a subsidy
6This result follows from multiplying equation (13  c) by (1  +t) and setting it equal to equation
(18c) because both equations equal zero at the steady state.
7At s  there is a subsidy,  so that  ,f < X.  Now  if there  were ever a tax corresponding  to some
lower level of s, Xf > Xk.  Between this point and the steady state, there would therefore have to
24coincides  with the intuition  that private  decisions  ignore  the benefits  to society  as a whole from  taking
preventive  and curative  measures.  Subsidization  is at equal  rates because  it is equally  beneficial  in
preventing  further  infection  to get a person  out of the infected  pool as to have  prevented  the  person  from
getting  into  it in the first  place. These  benefits  are equally  overlooked  by the private decision  makers.
This result  contradicts  what  may  be an often-held  presumption  that preventive  rather than  curative  efforts
are associated  with externalities.  In this model  in contrast  to the model  of vector-bome  diseases  in a
subsequent  section  of the paper,  preventive  activities  are pure private  goods  in that one person's
preventive  effort does  not affect  another  person's risk of infection  if the first person does  not become
infected.  Furthermore,  the govemment  does not have at its disposal  any technology  of intervention  that
private  people  do not have at theirs. The  extemality  therefore  arises  only through  an individual's  being
in the infected  pool, either through  getting  into  it without  consideration  of the risks posed  to others or
through  not getting  out of it fast  enough  for the same  reason.
C. Decentralization in the SID Model
In this case, private decisions are made by a family as given by the Hamiltonian of
equation (17) specialized to the SID model as defined in section ID.  As in the SIS model, if the
family is to be representative of society as a whole, s must equal sf. Once this substitution is
made, the only differences between the equations of the planner's problem and of the private
problem are the qj and an additional term of -ctxA5  in the equation for  i  as opposed to the
equation for  X s'-
be some intermediate  value of s < s * at which  A  - As  But at such a point,  ,i' is increasing
faster than  5, compare equations (1 8c) with (13c) evaluated at the common values of all
variables because the state and costate are equal for the private and public problems at this point
where the tax/subsidy equals zero. Consequently, i5f  could never fall relative to X, which would
contradict the existence of a steady-state subsidy. A similar argument holds for s > s once it is
noted that in these situations s is falling (rather than rising) toward the steady state.
25In contrast to an SIS disease, however, equiproportionate interventions directed at Pa and
Pb do not induce private decision makers to make the decisions that coincide with the social
planner's. Instead, the planner's path for s, a and b can be achieved by price interventions ta and tb
such that:




tanS (20b)  tb  - t
b
This result follows from the equation of the a'  and 5' prevailing under the private economy to
those under the social plan as given by the two sets of first-order conditions. Because 6' < 0 and
the multiplier is positive (section 1  D) the right-hand expression in equation (20b) is negative and
implies that the interventions are of opposite sign; if a is subsidized (ta <  0), then b is taxed.
In fact, at the steady state, a is subsidized and b is taxed. The steady-state subsidy is: 8
Xas
(21)  ta  = _  s  ,
I  Xas  +X,,i(8r-bB )
in which the (positive) multipliers are evaluated at the social planner's values. The reason that
curative expenditures are taxed here but subsidized in the SIS model is that here curative
'The result follows  from multiplying  the equation  for the change  in A5  by (1  +ta)  and equating  it to
the equation  for the change  in  5f  because  both changes  are zero in the steady  state.
26expenditures keep people in the pool of infectious people whereas in the SIS case curative
expenditures moved them out of the pool. While this conclusion may seem unpalatable,  the aim
of this model is only to show how policy offsets the pure infection externality. Away from the
steady state, the preventive intervention is also a subsidy (and correspondingly, the curative
intervention is a tax). The reason is the same as for the SIS model: at a point where X5  =  A5f,
comparison of the expressions for the change in these two multipliers shows that the change in
the former is smaller than the change in the latter.
D. Decentralization in the SIUModel
Decentralization is harder to analyze in the SIU model than in either the SIS or the SID
models. In the SIS and SID models there is only one multiplier equation that differs between the
social planner's and the family's problems, that associated with the change in s, whereas in the
SIU model there are two, associated with the changes in s and in i.  We have therefore only been
able to characterize the government's optimal interventions at the steady state.
Comparison of the results from the first-order conditions of the two problems shows that:
(22a)  (I +t  Af
and
(22b)  (I +tb)  =
These two equations plus the property that in the steady state (1+ta)  j  X i = 0 imply that the
steady state values of the two interventions are equal. Thus, in the steady state, there is an echo of
the SIS result that the government's optimal interventions are at the same rate.  And a similar
27intuition applies: At the steady state, either going into the infected pool or not getting out of it
imposes a similar externality because either is a permanent (i.e. steady-state) increase in the size
of the infected pool. Furthermore, the fact that (1  +tb)  X 5  =  0 in steady state implies that:
(23)  t  =  t  =  - (X<-X)s  <
with an inequality because the first-order condition with respect to a implies Xs  - Xi > 0.  At the
steady state the intervention is therefore a subsidy. We have not been able to derive any results
outside the steady state that parallel those for the SIS and SID cases. There is no reason to expect
the SIS result on equal subsidies to carry over to situations away from the steady state where
converting someone from an infected to an uninfectible is a permanent increase in people outside
the infected pool whereas keeping someone among the susceptibles may only be a temporary
decrease in the infected pool.
4.  Control of a Vector-Borne SIS Disease
Many infectious diseases are transmitted through intermediate hosts, such as mosquitos,
flies, ticks and snails.  These hosts must be infected to play their part in the cycle of infection.
For instance, in the case of malaria, infected mosquitos inject people with one stage of the
parasite thereby infecting them. Uninfected mosquitos that bite infected people are in turn
infected by a later developmental stage of the parasite in an infected person's blood, thereby
continuing the cycle. Interventions to affect the prevalence of these diseases can take many
forms and the package is more complicated than the distinction between preventive and curative
in sections 1 and 2.
28A model of malaria transmission must, therefore, comprise equations for the number of
people who are infected (I) and the number of mosquitos that are infected (Y).  For simplicity, we
will assume that the total population (of people) is fixed at N, so that there is neither natural
growth in the population nor are there deaths associated with malaria. The sum of the number of
susceptibles (S) and infecteds equals the whole population, S+I = N, and s, as before, is the
proportion of the population that is susceptible. Because we are interested in interventions that
affect the total number of mosquitos (M), we also specify the dynamics of the total mosquito
population. 9
The nunber  of infected people evolves according to:
(24)  I  = acaa 2My(N-I)  -PII.
The first part of this equation is the product of the number of people who are susceptible (N-I),
the proportion of mosquitos that are infected (y=Y/M), the ratio of mosquitos to people (m=M/N)
and two parameters a,, the number of bites that the average mosquito manages per unit time, and
a 2, the proportion of bites by infected mosquitos that lead to a human infection.  The second part
of the equation is the rate of recovery of infecteds.
The number of infected mosquitos evolves according to:
(25)  Y = atla,0  -S)(M-Y)-6,,Y 
The first part of this equation is the product of the number of mosquitos (M-Y) that are
9The  dynamic structure of infection in our model, equations (24) and (25), is an adaptation of
the discussion in Anderson and May (1991). As does their basic model, we ignore deaths from
malaria and the existence of an animal reservoir of infection on which mosquitos feed in addition
to the human population.
29susceptible to infection by the chance (1-s) that a person whom they bite is infected adjusted by
the rate of biting (a I) and the chance that such a bite leads to infection of the mosquito (a3).  The
second part of the equation subtracts the infected mosquitos that die; 5M is the death rate of
mosquitos regardless of whether they are infected or not. Finally, the change in the total number
of mosquitos is:
(26)  M=  F(M)  -6MM,
in which F'>O  and F"<O  so that there is a steady state population of mosquitos for a given value
of aM.
The objective of government policy is to maximize the present discounted value of social
welfare:
(27)  W  =  f N[Vo - (pXl -s) +pa a, +P  a2as  +p,d +  pbb(l -s))]  e -r"dt
0
Equation (27) incorporates a plausible targeting scenario for each of four interventions: (1)
promotion of the wearing of clothes and use of  bed nets that lower the chances of bites,
summarized by a,, so that a,(a,)  with al'<O; (2) provision of prophylactic drugs, a2, so that a2(a2)
with a 2k<O; (3) spraying mosquitos with insecticides with intensity d, so that 6(d) with 8M'>O;  (4)
provision of drugs that promote recovery, of amount b, so that f3(b)  with P'>O.
The current value Hamiltonian, H, is
(28)  H  = N  {  VO  - [pXI -s) +p,al+Pa 2s+Pd+Pbb(l  -s)]  }
+  AIJ-aIa 2mys+P(l-s)]
+  Xy[c1a( 3 (1-s)(l-Y)  -yF(AM)M-1]
+ Im[F(AM)  -dM  ,
30in which the Xi  are the current value multipliers associated with the states j  s, y and M. The
first-order conditions for this problem are:
(29a)  - =  NPa  -pa ala 2mYs  +Xy  X10 3(1-s)(1-y)  =  0 aa 1
(29b)  aH  _Npa,s -,Xs1a2mys  =0,
a22
(29c)  -a  = -Npb(l-s)  +XfJ/(1-s)  = 0
ab
and
(29d)  aH  = -Npf  -sM=  °
The associated equations for the multipliers are:
(29e)  "=  rX1 -[I-Paa 2 +Pbb  ]+;X(a(cz2my  +P)  +Xya 1 a 3(l1y)
(29A  Xy  rXy +Xala2mS  +xy[ala3(l-s)+F(MM 1 ]s
and
(29g)  XM  =rAM  rl±X,a( 2syN1  +X,yM- 1(F-FM- 1)  +;M(F'-6M)
Inspection of equations (29a-d) shows that there is, in general, no simple closed-forn
31solution for the relationship between the price-adjusted marginal products of the different
interventions. There is, however, one special case of interest.  If people either always take the
maximal precautions possible or do not take any at all, a, is not determined endogenously in the
model. In this case, equation (29a) is no longer operative and is instead replaced by an equation
that gives the exogenous value of a,.  Equations (29b-c) then show that the price-adjusted
marginal products of the °C 2 and b interventions depend only on the ratio of infected mosquitos to
people, and not on the proportion of people who are infected:
(30)  '  =__Pb  =  a  Y
a 2/Pa,  N
As in the other models, we introduce private decision making by assuming that certain
variables are taken as given by a family that is susceptible in the proportion sf . In this case, the
total mosquito population (M) and the extent of its infection (y) are exogenous to private
decision makers. These assumptions are extreme representations of any actual situation.  We are
treating insecticidal spraying as a pure public good, an extreme case of a pure prevention
externality in which no individual perceives any personal benefit from spraying but society as a
whole does. In reality, even at the household level, there is scope for diminishing the population
of mosquitos through insecticidal spraying, but the infiltration of mosquitos from outside the
household's area of control is much more rapid than if the government is doing co-ordinated
spraying over a large area.
The current value Hamiltonian, H, is
(31)  H  = N { Vo -[pXI  pSf)+(l  +ta  )Pa,a+(  +ta2)paa 2sf+(1 +tb)pbb(I  -s)]+T  }
+  I  [-axa 2 mysf+P(l-s  )]
32in which 5f  is the only multiplier and it is associated with the state sf; y and M are exogenous
functions of time from the family's perspective. The first order conditions for this problem are:
(32a)  aa  =  (1+ta  )pa  -1sa a2mys  0
(32b)  - -N(1+t.)p,, 2sf  -kcatacmYSf  =0
and
(32c)  - =  -N(1+tb)pb(1-s0  +kfYP(1-s0  =  0
ab
There is no equation for d because it is not a control, the assumption of a pure public good. The
associated equation for the multiplier is:
(32d)  v"  = rf  -[p-(l+ta  )pa 2+(l +t)pb  ]+(aamy  +a) s  2 2 +  bPb  s  1  2M
The complete dynamics of the system with private decision making is given by the addition of
sf =  s and equations (25) and (26).
Government intervention to transform the decisions of the family into the dynamics that
maximize social welfare requires two types of interventions: (1) a program of spraying (d) paid
for by the government consistent with equation (29d); and (2) a set of price interventions to
transform equations (32a-c) into equations (29a-c). Once this complete package is implemented,
it is clear from comparison of equations (29b-c) and (32b-c) that the effect of price interventions
for a2 and b is only through the transformation of <f  into A5. In other words, whatever the price
intervention it is applied at equal rates to the prices of these two instruments; this result parallels
33the equal-rate result of the SIS model and has the same intuition. So long as XY  < 0, comparison
of equation (29a) with equation (32a) shows that a, is subsidized less (or taxed more) than a 2 and
b.
5.  Conclusions
Our starting point for this paper has been a commonsensical one: Mathematical
epidemiology provides a parsimonious representation of how infectious diseases spread.
Economics suggests an objective function to evaluate the costs of infection and its associated
offsetting interventions, and especially a role for diminishing returns in the interventions that
affect the evolution of the epidemic. All these elements taken together specify the objectives and
constraints that deterrnine optimal interventions for public health in a hypothetical centrally
planned economy. The discrepancy between the social planner's solution and decentralized
decision making defines externalities in the economy, and the scope for subsidy/tax interventions
by government to maximize private welfare in the absence of central control of all decisions.
Although we set out a general formulation of this problem for infections that proceed
either to recovery and further susceptibility, immunity or death as well as a variant of an infection
that depends on vectors, by far the most tractable case is the first, the SIS model.  For this type of
disease, we looked at the effects of different targeting schemes on the phasing of preventive
inputs relative to curative ones, the response of the steady-state level of susceptibility to the
different prices in the model, and the role of subsidies in decentralizing the social planner's
problem.  In this model, the optimal intervention is a subsidy at the same rate to both preventive
and curative activities, both in the steady state and during the approach to it, and the result does
not depend on the form of targeting. By contrast, the phasing of the two interventions is
34qualitatively sensitive to the form of targeting. Even so, this model poses difficult technical
problems, most especially as regards the sufficient conditions for a welfare-maximizing dynamic
policy, something we largely addressed through numerical examples.
With regard to the other models, we provided some results, on the phasing of
interventions and on the subsidies and taxes necessary to achieve decentralization. Targeting is
again central to the phasing of interventions. What happens to the infected is critical to the
qualitative properties of the tax/subsidy interventions. The SIS model provides an anchor for the
discussion of these models, and some of the SIS results re-appear in one form or another
underlining the usefulness of the SIS model as a starting point for the analysis. But these models
are all inherently of higher dimension than the SIS model and their properties as a whole are
generally more difficult to analyze. Undoubtedly, further progress will depend on more
numerical work, but again the insights of the SIS model should provide guidance in
interpretation.
Appendix A
The Second-Order Conditions  for the SIS Model
While the current-value Hamiltonian for the SIS model, H,  is jointly concave in the
controls and the multiplier A,  is positive, the maximized Hamiltonian, H*,  is not concave in the
state variable, s.  Instead, the maximized Hamiltonian is unambiguously convex in s because
(A.1)  aH2  -p.(aS05a+aOsa5)  -A,[o (1 -2s)a,-2a&]>0
as can be shown using equations (13a) and (15b) and any of the four definitions of Oa.  The
35commonly-used Arrow sufficiency condition (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, 1981) for a maximum
is therefore not fulfilled.
Despite this failure of the commonly-used sufficiency condition, we believe that the
problem of section 1  C is well posed and its solution is characterized by the first-order conditions
and the phase diagrams. There are three reasons for our belief.
First, at an intuitive level, the a and P3  functions may exhibit steeply diminishing returns.
In this case, it is hard to see how the solution could be characterized by anything but a
conventional optimizing approach to a steady-state level of infection.
Second, consistent with this intuition, the Arrow conditions seem much stronger than are
necessary. Zeiden (1984) presents weaker conditions but they are not easy to apply.
Third, and to us most convincing, we next present the results of a numerical
implementation of the model using dynamic programming that seems well-behaved and
consistent with the optimal-control treatment of the SIS model in section IC. The parameters we
use are: V0 = 1600; P, = 1600; Pa = 0.25; Pb  = 2; E = 0; 1+ r = 1/.9; Oa = S; Ob  =  (l-s).  The
functional forms for a and ,( are:
(A.2)  a  0.2-  - ;  =  0.08+- b
800  800
In principle, sufficiently  high values of a or b would violate  a > 0  and ,B  < 1; in practice, the
simulations do not produce such values. Because both exponents in equation (A.2) are the same,
equation (14) for 4t implies a closed-form relation between the ratios of the inputs, b/a, and (1 -
s).
The dynamic equation is the discrete version of equation (12).  In this case, if nothing is
36done, the equilibrium is an internal one with the steady- state fraction of the population being
s=  .08/.20 = 0.40 and the corresponding value of W =6400.  We found the policy rule by
iterating on the value function.  '0 The computation seemed well-behaved and straightforward,
except that there was some slight instability in the values of the controls for the last few values of
s at either end of its range. This instability seemed to be associated with the interpolation
because it seemed always to be pushed to the end when we added additional points. To save
space, Table A.  1 shows selected values of the (endogenous) parameters of the model (cx  and )
and the value function (W) for values of the state (s). The steady state  value of s is
(approximately) 0.443 and the value of moving there from the no-intervention steady-state value
of s is the difference between 6400 and 6568.
We increased the four price parameters to indicate the responsiveness of the steady state
value of s, s*. A ten percent increase in p, increases s* by 0.9 percent.  A ten percent increase in
Pa decreases s* by 0.7 percent.  A ten percent increase in Pb decreases s* by 0.6 percent. A ten
percent increase in (1+r) decreases s* by 3.2 percent.  All the simulations for these comparative
steady-state  results as well as other similar sensitivity analysis suggest a well-behaved problem.
" 0We used a grid of 417 points,  with s ranging  from  0.005  to 0.985. The density  of points  was not
uniform  and was chosen  to provide  increased  accuracy  at the limits  of the range and around  the steady
state . We interpolated  the value  function  for intermediate  values  of s using  a cubic spline.  We  accepted
that the value  function  had converged  when  the maximum  proportional  change  in the value  function  at
every  s in an iteration  was less than .000001. All calculations  were done in double-precision  FORTRAN.
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38Table 1
Targeting and the Relative Reliance on
Preventive and Curative Policies
[Values of (  of Equation (14)1
Values of Qb
1.  HI.
1  (1  -S)
Values of Oa
A.  1  s  s(1-s)
B.  s  1  (1-s)
C.  (1-S)  s/(l-s)  s
D.  s(1-s)  1/(1-s)  I
Table A.1
The Policy Rules and Value Function
s  a  j  w
.100  .1846  .0821  4566
.200  .1852  .0823  5170
.300  .1860 .0825  5833
.400  .1868  .0827  6568
.443  .1871  .0828  6911
.500  .1877  .0830  7394
.600  .1887 .0835  8338
.700  .1900  .0841  9445
.800  .1917  .0851  10801
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